Secretus vs Yopass
Credit where due: Yopass gets the cryptography right. It encrypts in your browser, puts the decryption key in the URL fragment, and its server stores only ciphertext — the same zero-knowledge model Secretus uses for async secrets. If a friend asks for a simple, self-hostable secret-sharing tool, Yopass is a good answer.
The difference is scope. Yopass does one thing: encrypted drop-a-secret. Secretus is built for the workflows around it — a live peer-to-peer mode with Signal Protocol where the secret never touches a server, forward secrecy, hybrid post-quantum key agreement, Shamir k-of-n splitting for teams, requesting secrets from others, and an audit trail for compliance.
Side by side
| Feature | Secretus | Yopass |
|---|---|---|
| Client-side encryption (browser) | ||
| Decryption key in URL fragment | ||
| Server stores only ciphertext | ||
| One-time self-destructing links | Always — atomic delete on read | Optional setting |
| Live P2P mode — secret never stored anywhere | Signal Protocol over WebRTC | |
| Forward secrecy (Double Ratchet) | ||
| Post-quantum key agreement | Hybrid ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) | |
| Team k-of-n splitting (Shamir) | ||
| Request a secret from someone | ||
| Audit log (hashed IDs, 90-day TTL) | ||
| Open source / self-hostable | Client code runs unobfuscated; hosted EU | Yes — fully open source |
When Yopass is the better fit
- • You want a minimal, fully open-source tool you can self-host and audit end to end.
- • All you need is encrypted one-off sharing, with no team workflows around it.
When Secretus is the better fit
- • You sometimes need the secret to never exist on any server — live P2P with forward secrecy.
- • You operate as a team: Shamir k-of-n split for shared credentials, secret requests, audit trail.
- • You want post-quantum protection against harvest-now-decrypt-later, today.
- • You want delivery confirmation and one-time reads enforced atomically, not as an option.
Frequently asked questions
Isn't Yopass just as secure as Secretus?
For async drop-a-secret sharing, the core model is the same and genuinely good: browser-side encryption, key in the fragment, ciphertext-only server. Secretus adds layers Yopass doesn't have — Signal Protocol P2P with forward secrecy, hybrid post-quantum key agreement, and Shamir splitting so no single person or channel holds the whole secret.
What does the live P2P mode add over async sharing?
In live mode the encrypted secret travels directly between the two browsers over WebRTC — it is never written to any server, and Double Ratchet gives forward secrecy: even if a key leaked later, past messages stay safe. Async tools, Yopass included, always leave ciphertext on a server until it's read or expires.
Why does post-quantum matter for a secret that self-destructs?
Ciphertext can be recorded in transit today and decrypted years from now once quantum computers mature — 'harvest now, decrypt later'. Secretus hybridises ECDH with ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203), so recorded traffic stays safe even against a future quantum adversary.
Try it yourself — share a secret end-to-end encrypted, no account required.
Share a secret nowComparison reflects publicly documented behaviour as of June 2026. Spotted an inaccuracy? Tell us and we'll fix it.